Vigorous debate over the moral propriety of cognitive enhancement exists, but the views of the public have been largely absent from the discussion. To address this gap in our knowledge, four experiments were carried out with contrastive vignettes in order to obtain quantitative data on public attitudes towards cognitive enhancement. The data collected suggest that the public is sensitive to and capable of understanding the four cardinal concerns identified by neuroethicists, and tend to cautiously accept cognitive enhancement even as they (...) recognize its potential perils. The public is biopolitically moderate, endorses both meritocratic principles and the intrinsic value of hard work, and appears to be sensitive to the salient moral issues raised in the debate. Taken together, these data suggest that public attitudes toward enhancement are sufficiently sophisticated to merit inclusion in policy deliberations, especially if we seek to align public sentiment and policy. (shrink)

Comparatively easy questions we might ask about creativity are distinguished from the hard question of explaining transformative creativity. Many have focused on the easy questions, offering no reason to think that the imagining relied upon in creative cognition cannot be reduced to more basic folk psychological states. The relevance of associative thought processes to songwriting is then explored as a means for understanding the nature of transformative creativity. Productive artificial neural networks—known as generative antagonistic networks (GANs)—are a recent example of (...) how a system’s ability to generate novel products can both be finely tuned by prior experience and grounded in strategies that cannot be articulated by the system itself. Further, the kinds of processes exploited by GANs need not be seen as incorporating something akin to sui generis imaginative states. The chapter concludes with reflection on the added relevance of personal character to explanations of creativity. [This is Chapter 12 of the book Explaining Imagination.]. (shrink)

Mặc dù vẫn còn những nghi ngờ về sự thay đổi khí hậu trong một số tài liệu nghiên cứu, sự đồng thuận mạnh mẽ trong cộng đồng khoa học vẫn xác định rằng nhiệt độ bề mặt toàn cầu đã tăng trong vài thập kỷ gần đây. Biến đổi khí hậu, chủ yếu là kết quả của hoạt động con người, đang trở thành một trong những thách thức toàn cầu cấp bách nhất của thời đại chúng ta. Trong (...) thập kỷ vừa qua, con người đã thực hiện những nỗ lực đáng kể để đối phó với cuộc khủng hoảng biến đổi khí hậu và đã đạt được những ảnh hưởng nhất định trong việc chống lại biến đổi khí hậu và tạo ra nhận thức sâu rộng về hậu quả của nó. Tuy nhiên, câu hỏi tiếp tục đặt ra là liệu chúng ta đang đi đúng hướng để giải quyết cuộc khủng hoảng này một cách hiệu quả hay không? Bài tiểu luận này sẽ xem xét những thành tựu trong cuộc chiến chống biến đổi khí hậu, nhận thức ngày càng tăng về tác động của nó, mức độ nghiêm trọng ngày càng tăng của khủng hoảng khí hậu và liệu hành động của chúng ta đã đi đúng hướng chưa hay liệu chúng ta có cần xem xét lại cách tiếp cận của mình hay không. (shrink)

Gần đây, bài nghiên cứu xuất bản trên tạp chí Environmental Humanities của tác giả Schneider-Mayerson đã thu hút được sự quan tâm của đông đảo học giới, chính giới và các nhóm hoạt động xã hội vì môi trường sống toàn cầu [1]. Cụ thể, tác giả tìm tòi trong địa hạt “climate fiction” – tức là thể loại văn học không giấu chủ đích, nhằm vào nội dung trực diện đối với vấn nạn khủng hoảng khí hậu – (...) đang bùng nổ về số lượng tác phẩm trong thập niên đầu thế kỷ 21 (gọi tắt là cli-fi). Thường khi nghe qua phần đông cho rằng, thể loại tác phẩm này sẽ có tác động sinh thái-chính trị tích cực thông qua trang bị cơ sở thông tin cho độc giả nhận biết tương lai khí hậu và thuyết phục về mức độ ảnh hưởng khẩn cấp của biến đổi khí hậu. (shrink)

Trong những năm gần đây, tính cấp thiết và tầm quan trọng của việc giải quyết vấn đề biến đổi khí hậu ngày càng gia tăng, từ một vấn đề thuần túy về môi trường, nó đã trở thành một thách thức chính trị - xã hội phức tạp. Thậm chí, một số nhà nghiên cứu cho rằng tác động của biến đổi khí hậu toàn cầu đối với an ninh quốc tế có thể mang tính lịch sử, thách thức (...) hơn những mối đe dọa toàn cầu trước đây như phổ biến vũ khí hạt nhân, Đại suy thoái và khủng bố. (shrink)

Sau gần 30 năm đi vào vận hành, thị trường tín chỉ carbon đã thể hiện nhiều điểm bất hợp lý và xa rời thực tế của nó trong công cuộc chống biến đổi khí hậu.

Vào thời kỳ khai sáng, để trao đổi ý tưởng khoa học, các nhà triết học và sử học tự nhiên thường xuất bản chung một quyển sách và viết thư cho nhau. Điều này tạo tiền đề cho việc thành lập các hội và các tạp chí khoa học đầu tiên trên thế giới. Các hội học thuật bao gồm Viện Hàn lâm Khoa học Leopoldina (năm 1652), Hội Hoàng gia Luân Đôn (1660), và Học viện Khoa học Pháp (...) (1666). Tạp chí khoa học đầu tiên là Journal des sçavans (tháng 01/1665) và ngay sau đấy là Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society (tháng 03/1665). Việc xuất hiện các tạp chí học thuật có thể xem như là kết quả của một quá trình “tiến hóa”, trong đó giới khoa học cố gắng tìm cách cải thiện hiệu suất và hiệu quả của việc lưu thông và trao đổi các thông tin khoa học. Tuy nhiên, khi số lượng thông tin tăng nhanh chóng, việc đảm bảo chất lượng là một trong những ưu tiên hàng đầu của giới khoa học. Nhu cầu này dẫn đến sự xuất hiện của hệ thống bình duyệt và gần đây là cơ chế rút bài báo khoa học. (shrink)

Thị trường tín chỉ carbon tự nguyện là một cơ chế quen tên, đã được triển khai rộng rãi trên thế giới với mục tiêu giảm lượng phát thải khí nhà kính (GHG). Thị trường này hoạt động bằng cách đặt ra giới hạn về lượng phát thải cho các công ty và cho phép họ mua bán ‘tín chỉ carbon’ tương ứng với mỗi tấn phát thải được loại bỏ. Những giao dịch này được thiết kế với hy vọng (...) tạo ra một cơ chế tự điều chỉnh để cân bằng lượng carbon trong khí quyển bằng cách giảm hoặc loại bỏ CO2 (hoặc các khí nhà kính khác) ở một địa điểm nhằm bù đắp cho lượng phát thải được tạo ra ở nơi khác. -/- Thị trường tín chỉ carbon là một ví dụ cơ bản của lối tư duy kinh tế tân cổ điển, cho rằng các hoạt động kinh tế như sản xuất và tiêu dùng gây ra tác động tiêu cực đến môi trường, nhưng những chi phí này thường không được các bên gây ra gánh chịu, dẫn đến một dạng thức thất bại thị trường. Vì thế, khi những ngoại tác tương tự (các vấn đề biến đổi khí hậu hay suy thoái môi trường v.v) được tích hợp vào hệ thống kinh tế, thị trường được kỳ vọng sẽ cải thiện năng lực và hiệu quả phân bổ nguồn lực cũng như nhân lực trong xã hội một cách tối ưu để giải quyết các vấn đề môi trường. -/- Tuy nhiên, sau gần 30 năm đi vào vận hành, thị trường tín chỉ carbon đã thể hiện nhiều điểm bất hợp lý và xa rời thực tế của nó trong công cuộc chống biến đổi khí hậu. (shrink)

Hậu quả và ảnh hưởng của biến đổi khí hậu, mất đa dạng sinh thái, và suy thoái môi trường đang dần trở nên rõ ràng hơn. Điều này cũng kéo theo sự gia tăng nhanh chóng các mâu thuẫn và xung đột xã hội. Chính vì thế, trong những năm gần đây, việc kiện tụng liên quan đến môi trường đang ngày trở nên nhiều hơn, và quy mô cũng lớn hơn, đặc biệt là giữa các công ty và (...) nhà hoạt động môi trường. Những vụ kiện này thường xoay quanh các vấn đề quan trọng như biến đổi khí hậu, ô nhiễm, khai thác tài nguyên hủy hoại môi trường sống, gây rối loạn hệ sinh thái, hủy diệt đa dạng sinh học, và tiêu diệt nguồn sinh kế của người dân. Để đạt được các mục tiêu giảm biến đổi khí hậu, bảo vệ môi trường và môi sinh, đồng thời đảm bảo sự phát triển bền vững, cũng như là công lý cho cả con người và thiên nhiên, chính quyền và hệ thống tư pháp cần hiểu rõ bản chất bản chất của các mâu thuẫn dẫn đến cuộc chiến pháp lý về môi trường. Bài viết này có mục đích tìm hiểu bối cảnh phức tạp của các cuộc chiến pháp lý về môi trường, làm sáng tỏ tầm quan trọng và kết quả tiềm tàng của chúng, từ đó chỉ ra một số lỗ hổng pháp lý và khiếu kiện môi trường tại Việt Nam. (shrink)

Hậu quả và ảnh hưởng của biến đổi khí hậu, mất đa dạng sinh thái, và suy thoái môi trường đang dần trở nên rõ ràng hơn. Điều này cũng kéo theo sự gia tăng nhanh chóng các mâu thuẫn và xung đột xã hội. Chính vì thế, trong những năm gần đây, việc kiện tụng liên quan đến môi trường đang ngày trở nên nhiều hơn, và quy mô cũng lớn hơn, đặc biệt là giữa các công ty và (...) nhà hoạt động môi trường. Những vụ kiện này thường xoay quanh các vấn đề quan trọng như: biến đổi khí hậu, ô nhiễm, khai thác tài nguyên hủy hoại môi trường sống, gây rối loạn hệ sinh thái, hủy diệt đa dạng sinh học, và tiêu diệt nguồn sinh kế của người dân. (shrink)

Vấn đề môi trường là trọng tâm của các cuộc thảo luận chính trị trong những năm gần đây, với việc các nhà lãnh đạo trên toàn thế giới thực hiện các biện pháp chống biến đổi khí hậu và giảm phát thải khí nhà kính. Để theo đuổi mục tiêu bảo vệ môi trường và giảm thiểu biến đổi khí hậu, Tổng thống Joe Biden đã thực hiện một loạt hành động nhằm giảm phát thải khí nhà kính và (...) hạn chế sự phụ thuộc của chúng ta vào nhiên liệu hóa thạch. Trong số các sáng kiến này, quyết định của Tổng thống Biden về việc đóng cửa Đường ống Keystone XL, hạn chế hoạt động khoan dầu ở một số khu vực nhất định và cấm cấp phép khai thác dầu khí mới trên các vùng đất và vùng biển công cộng là một động thái quan trọng. Tuy nhiên, những chính sách này đã gây ra cả sự ủng hộ lẫn tranh cãi. Trong bài viết này, chúng tôi đi sâu vào sự phức tạp trong các chính sách môi trường của Tổng thống Biden, đặc biệt tập trung vào lệnh cấm cấp phép khai thác dầu khí mới trên các vùng đất và vùng biển công cộng. (shrink)

What should we do about “tainted” public commemorations? Recent events have highlighted the urgency of reaching a consensus on this question. However, existing discussions appear to be dominated by two naïve opposing views – to remove or preserve them. My aims in this essay are two-fold. First, I argue that the two views are not naïve, but undergirded by concerns with securing self-respect and with the character of our engagement with the past. Second, I offer a qualified defence of vandalising (...) tainted commemorations. The defence comprises two parts. I consider two prominent suggestions – to install counter-commemorations and to add contextualising plaques – and argue that they are typically beset with difficulties. I then argue that in some circumstances, constrained vandalism is a response to tainted commemorations which effectively adjudicates the demands of the two opposing views. (shrink)

Commemorative artefacts purportedly speak – they communicate messages to their audience, even if no words are uttered. Sometimes, such artefacts purportedly communicate demeaning or pejorative messages about some members of society. The characteristics of such speech are, however, under-examined. I present an account of the paradigmatic characteristics of the speech of commemorative artefacts (or, “commemorative artefactual speech”), as a distinct form of political speech. According to my account, commemorative artefactual speech paradigmatically involves the use of an artefact by an authorised (...) member of a group to declare the importance of remembering a subject, in virtue of some feature of the subject. Then, I outline a variety of ways that commemorative artefactual speech can go awry. Such speech can be unauthorised, involve unfair exclusion or incorrect identification, be aesthetically inadequate, invoke clandestine explanations, and be directed at inappropriate subjects. I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my account for resisting problematic commemorative artefactual speech. (shrink)

One recurring criticism of the best interests standard concerns its vagueness, and thus the inadequate guidance it offers to care providers. The lack of an agreed definition of ‘best interests’, together with the fact that several suggested considerations adopted in legislation or professional guidelines for doctors do not obviously apply across different groups of persons, result in decisions being made in murky waters. In response, bioethicists have attempted to specify the best interests standard, to reduce the indeterminacy surrounding medical decisions. (...) In this paper, we discuss the bioethicists’ response in relation to the state's possible role in clarifying the best interests standard. We identify and characterise two clarificatory strategies employed by bioethicists —elaborative and enumerative—and argue that the state should adopt the latter. Beyond the practical difficulties of the former strategy, a state adoption of it would inevitably be prejudicial in a pluralistic society. Given the gravity of best interests decisions, and the delicate task of respecting citizens with different understandings of best interests, only the enumerative strategy is viable. We argue that this does not commit the state to silence in providing guidance to and supporting healthcare providers, nor does it facilitate the abuse of the vulnerable. Finally, we address two methodological worries about adopting this approach at the state level. The adoption of the enumerative strategy is not defeatist in attitude, nor does it eventually collapse into (a form of) the elaborative strategy. (shrink)

What is it for something to be a disability? Elizabeth Barnes, focusing on physical disabilities, argues that disability is a social category. It depends on the rules undergirding the judgements of the disability rights movement. Barnes’ account may strike many as implausible. I articulate the unease, in the form of three worries about Barnes’ account. It does not fully explain why the disability rights movement is constituted in such a way that it only picks out paradigmatic disability traits, nor why (...) only the traits identified by the movement as constituting experiences of social and political constraint count as disability. It also leaves out the contribution of people other than disability activists, to the definition of disability. I develop Barnes’ account. On my account, a person is disabled if she is in some state which is constitutive of some constraint on her legitimate interests. This state must be the subject of legitimate medical interest and be picked out by the disability rights movement as among the traits for which they are seeking to promote progress and change. My account addresses the worries about Barnes’ account. It is also able to include all disabilities, rather than only physical ones. (shrink)

One of the central claims of the neurodiversity movement is that society should accommodate the needs of autistics, rather than try to treat autism. People have variously tried to reject this accommodation thesis as applicable to all autistics. One instance is Pier Jaarsma and Stellan Welin, who argue that the thesis should apply to some but not all autistics. They do so via separating autistics into high- and low-functioning, on the basis of IQ and social effectiveness or functionings. I reject (...) their grounds for separating autistics. IQ is an irrelevant basis for separating autistics. Charitably rendering it as referring to more general capacities still leaves us mistaken about the roles they play in supporting the accommodation thesis. The appeal to social effectiveness or functionings relies on standards that are inapplicable to autistics, and which risks being deaf to the point of their claims. I then consider if their remaining argument concerning autistic culture may succeed independently of the line they draw. I argue that construing autistics' claims as beginning from culture mistakes their status, and may even detract from their aims. Via my discussion of Jaarsma and Welin, I hope to point to why the more general strategy of separating autistics, in response to the accommodation thesis, does not fully succeed. Finally, I sketch some directions for future discussions, arguing that we should instead shift our attention to consider another set of questions concerning the costs and extent of change required to accommodate all autistics. (shrink)

I attempt to adjudicate the disagreement between those who seek to reconceptualize disability as mere difference and their opponents. I do so by reviewing a central conviction motivating the resistance, concerning the relationship between disability and well-being. I argue that the conviction depends on further considerations about the costs and extent of change involved in accommodating individuals with a particular disability trait. I conclude by considering three pay-offs of this clarification.

In analysing the problems with commemorative artefacts, philosophers have tended to focus on objectionable monuments that honour inappropriate subjects. The problems with such monuments, however, do not exhaust problems with a society’s public commemorative landscape – the totality of public commemorative artefacts in general, and the institutions involved in their creation and maintenance. I argue that a public commemorative landscape can implicate authoritative ideas, including stereotypes about people in virtue of their group membership. This contributes to what I term hermeneutical (...) constriction – a situation in which people are given reason to rely on an authoritative subset of the totality of hermeneutical resources that they actually have access to. Critiquing and resisting these problems with a public commemorative landscape that contributes to hermeneutical constriction is fraught with difficulties. Attempts to do so render activists vulnerable to a range of serious criticisms. (shrink)

According to a prominent argument, citizens in unjust societies have a duty to resist injustice. The moral and political principles that ground the duty to obey the law in just or nearly just conditions, also ground the duty to resist in unjust conditions. This argument is often applied to a variety of unjust conditions. In this essay, I critically examine this argument, focusing on conditions involving institutionally entrenched and socially normalised injustice. In such conditions, the issue of citizens’ duties to (...) resist is complicated. I conclude by considering how my discussions may clarify a contemporary problem about engaging in resistance to aid potential migrants who have been turned away by states in accordance with widely accepted rules. (shrink)

Effective altruism is purportedly ecumenical towards different moral views, charitable causes, and evidentiary methods. I argue that effective altruists’ criticisms of purportedly less effective charities are inconsistent with their commitment to ecumenicity. Individuals may justifiably support charities other than those recommended by effective altruism. If effective altruists take their commitment to ecumenicity seriously, they will have to revise their criticisms of many of these charities.

John Rawls’s use of the “fully cooperating assumption” has been criticized for hindering attempts to address the needs of disabled individuals, or non-cooperators. In response, philosophers sympathetic to Rawls’s project have extended his theory. I assess one such extension by Cynthia Stark, that proposes dropping Rawls’s assumption in the constitutional stage (of his four-stage sequence), and address the needs of non-cooperators via the social minimum. I defend Stark’s proposal against criticisms by Sophia Wong, Christie Hartley, and Elizabeth Edenberg and Marilyn (...) Friedman. Nevertheless, I argue that Stark’s proposal is crucially incomplete. Her formulation of the social minimum lacks accompanying criteria with which the adequacy of the provisions for non-cooperators may be assessed. Despite initial appearances, Stark’s proposal does not fully address the needs of non-cooperators. I conclude by considering two payoffs of identifying this lack of criteria. (shrink)

The concept of causation is essential for understanding relationships among various phenomena, yet its fundamental nature and the criteria for establishing it continue to be debated. This paper presents a new theory of causation through a quasi-axiomatic approach. The core of this framework is Probability Distribution Determinism (PDD), which updates traditional determinism by representing states of affairs as probability distributions, with the if-then function serving as its foundational definition. Based on PDD, by merely using appropriate naming strategies, it is possible (...) to derive systems in which the structural characteristics of relationships among things closely resemble those in the real world, such as having various forms of nested hierarchies. Additionally, there are two related yet distinctly different contexts about relationships in PDD: one emphasizes the potential influence of conditions on outcomes in the general sense, while the other focuses on attributing responsibility for the state changes in specific scenarios. The formula for determining the relationship in the general sense is established as S(Y |S1(X), Ψ) ̸≡ S(Y |S2(X), Ψ). Subsequently, within the PDD framework, the paper clarifies the legitimate use of a series of concepts related to causation in those two contexts, thus encompassing the entire detailed connotation of the concept of causation. The comparison with other theories of causation and the analysis of case applications demonstrate that the new theory applies not only to situations where other theories are competent but also to situations where they are not. This suggests that, although certain aspects within the new framework may require further analysis, it provides a highly promising direction for a deeper understanding of causation. (shrink)

In ontological debates, realists typically argue for their view via one of two approaches. The _Quinean approach_ employs naturalistic arguments that say our scientific practices give us reason to affirm the existence of a kind of entity. The _Fregean approach_ employs linguistic arguments that say we should affirm the existence of a kind of entity because our discourse contains reference to those entities. These two approaches are often seen as distinct, with _indispensability arguments_ typically associated with the former, but not (...) the latter, approach. This paper argues for a connection between the two approaches on the grounds that the typical arguments of the Fregean approach can be reformulated as indispensability arguments. This connection is significant in at least two ways. First, it implies that indispensability arguments provide a common framework within which to compare the Quinean and Fregean approaches, which allows for a more precise delineation of the two approaches. Second, it implies the possibility of analogical relations that allow proponents and opponents of each approach to draw upon the ideas that have been developed regarding the other. (shrink)

Not only the direct physical experiences of deployment can severely harm soldiers’ mental health. Witnessing violations of their moral principles by the enemy, or by their fellow soldiers and superiors, can also have a devastating impact. It can cause soldiers’ moral disorientation, increasing feelings of shame, guilt, or hate, and the need for general answers on questions of right and wrong. Various attempts have been made to keep soldiers mentally sane. One is to provide convincing causes for their deployment, which (...) risks an “end justifies the means” way of thinking. The good cause can provide a moral justification for horrible atrocities. Another method, introduced in the USA, Canada, and Australia, aims to strengthen military personnel’s resistance by promoting and maintaining a happy, optimistic state of mind through the use of positive psychology. Alongside making soldiers “morally fit” for all kinds of situations, the focus could also be on moral recovery and forgiveness. Such a care-based military ethics approach, aimed at mutual understanding and interdependence, could help soldiers handle the emotional impact of moral conflicts. This demands that military units reflect on their organizational culture and rethink oaths and codes of conduct that focus mainly on efficiency and readiness, as well as the soldierly self-image with its seemingly still deeply rooted warrior ethos. Today, resilience and positive psychology in the military is apparently mainly geared to assuring its soldiers’ readiness. An appropriate set of virtues and understanding of virtue ethics that are less centered on self-perfection and autonomy could point to a different form of character-building and lead to a better understanding of others. (shrink)

Peter Ludlow shows how word meanings are much more dynamic than we might have supposed, and explores how they are modulated even during everyday conversation. The resulting view is radical, and has far-reaching consequences for our political and legal discourse, and for enduring puzzles in the foundations of semantics, epistemology, and logic.

A review of Elizabeth Barnes' The Minority Body.

Scriptural Reasoning (SR) is a practice of philosophic theology that is offered as a rationally warranted albeit fallible response to the inadequacies of modern liberal and anti-liberal theologies whether they are adopted as academic projects or as dimensions of lived religious practice. In terms of everyday religious practice in the West today, SR may be characterized as an effort, at once, to help protect Abrahamic folk traditions (that is, of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam) from the cultural and theological effects of (...) residual western colonialism and to help protect religiously pluralist societies in the West from reactionary, anti-modern movements within these traditions. In the terms of recent academic discourse in theology, SR may be characterized as pragmatic, postliberal, scriptural, and inter-Abrahamic. SR may be labeled “pragmatic,” because it employs philosophic reasoning only to identify problems in its practitioners’ communities of everyday practice and in the institutions that are expected to repair them. SR may be labeled “postliberal,” because it emerges as a response to problems in the projects of modern, liberal theology, in particular this theology’s inadequate attention to problems in everyday practice. At the same time, SR is equally critical of anti-liberal theologies, or those that, rejecting the autonomy of human reason, argue for the opposite: grounding all projects of reasoning on a practice of “Christian reasoning” per se (or, comparably, of other confession-grounded reasonings). (shrink)

I review José Medina's The Epistemology of Protest: Silencing, Epistemic Activism, and the Communicative Life of Resistance, and raise some questions about the felicity, legitimacy and civility of protest.

Social movements often impose nontrivial costs on others against their wills. Civil disobedience is no exception. How can social movements in general, and civil disobedience in particular, be justifiable despite this apparent wrong-making feature? We examine an intuitively plausible account—it is fair that everyone should bear the burdens of tackling injustice. We extend this fairness-based argument for civil disobedience to defend some acts of uncivil disobedience. Focusing on uncivil environmental activism—such as ecotage (sabotage with the aim of protecting the environment)—we (...) argue that some acts of uncivil disobedience can be morally superior to their civil counterparts, when and because such acts target people who are responsible for environmental threats. Indeed, insofar as some acts of uncivil disobedience can more accurately target responsible people, they can better satisfy the demands of fairness compared to their civil counterparts. In some circumstances, our argument may require activists to engage in uncivil disobedienceeven whencivil disobedience is available. (shrink)

Robert Audi’s Seeing, Knowing, and Doing argues that knowledge does not entail justification, given a broadly externalist conception of knowledge and an access internalist conception of justification, where justification requires the ability to cite one’s grounds or reasons. On this view, animals and small children can have knowledge while lacking justification. About cases like these and others, Audi concludes that knowledge does not entail justification. But the access internalist sense of “justification” is but one of at least two ordinary senses (...) of the term. On a broader or looser sense, “justification” means “being in the right” where that involves meeting a standard or norm. I argue that the beliefs of animals and small children can then meet standards or norms associated with truth and knowledge such that their beliefs may count as justified in this broader or looser sense. I then question whether knowledge fails to entail justification on this broader sense. (shrink)

This chapter provides an introduction to higher-order metaphysics as well as to the contributions to this volume. We discuss five topics, corresponding to the five parts of this volume, and summarize the contributions to each part. First, we motivate the usefulness of higher-order quantification in metaphysics using a number of examples, and discuss the question of how such quantifiers should be interpreted. We provide a brief introduction to the most common forms of higher-order logics used in metaphysics, and indicate a (...) number of questions which can be raised in such systems using logical vocabulary alone. Using a further example, we return to applications of higher-order logics in metaphysics. We also mention key developments in the history of higher-order logic as it pertains to metaphysics. Finally, we mention certain arguments which have been raised against the use of higher-order logic, and some ways of responding to them. (shrink)

You don't say much about who you are teaching, or what subject you teach, but you do seem to see a need to justify what you are doing. Perhaps you're teaching underprivileged children, opening their minds to possibilities that might otherwise never have occurred to them. Or maybe you're teaching the children of affluent families and opening their eyes to the big moral issues they will face in life — like global poverty, and climate change. If you're doing something like (...) this, then stick with it. Giving money isn't the only way to make a difference. (shrink)

Introduction: During the COVID-19 pandemic, adolescents have increasingly suffered from online problem behaviors and mental disorders. But little research has paid attention to the protective factors among adolescents. Therefore, the present study attempted to investigate the role of positive youth development (PYD) attributes in adolescents’ depression, internet gaming disorder (IGD) and cyberbullying/victimization (CBV). -/- Methods: A total of 995 Chinese adolescents (Mage = 15.97 years, SD = 0.77, 325 boys) from two public high schools in Hubei province were recruited to (...) participate in the three-wave longitudinal study over the span of 1 year during the pandemic (Time 1: November, 2020; Time 2: May, 2021; Time 3: November, 2021). -/- Results: T1 PYD attributes negatively predicted T2 depression and T3 online problematic behaviors. T2 depression positively predicted IGD at T3. T3 IGD significantly predicted greater involvement in T3 CBV, and vice versa. Moreover, depression and one online problem behavior mediated the relationships between PYD attributes and the other online problem behavior, separately and sequentially. (shrink)

We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation models (...) the topic-sensitivity of information, allowing us to invalidate controversial forms of epistemic closure while validating less controversial ones. Thus, unlike the standard modal framework for epistemic logic, KRI accommodates plausible approaches to the Kripke-Harman dogmatism paradox, which bear on non-monotonicity, or on topic-sensitivity. KRI also strikes a better balance between agent idealization and a non-trivial logic of knowledge ascriptions. (shrink)

For synergistic interactions between humans and artificial intelligence (AI) systems, AI outputs often need to be explainable to people. Explainable AI (XAI) systems are commonly tested in human user studies. However, whether XAI researchers consider potential cultural differences in human explanatory needs remains unexplored. We highlight psychological research that found significant differences in human explanations between many people from Western, commonly individualist countries and people from non-Western, often collectivist countries. We argue that XAI research currently overlooks these variations and that (...) many popular XAI designs implicitly and problematically assume that Western explanatory needs are shared cross-culturally. Additionally, we systematically reviewed over 200 XAI user studies and found that most studies did not consider relevant cultural variations, sampled only Western populations, but drew conclusions about human-XAI interactions more generally. We also analyzed over 30 literature reviews of XAI studies. Most reviews did not mention cultural differences in explanatory needs or flag overly broad cross-cultural extrapolations of XAI user study results. Combined, our analyses provide evidence of a cultural bias toward Western populations in XAI research, highlighting an important knowledge gap regarding how culturally diverse users may respond to widely used XAI systems that future work can and should address. (shrink)

This is a genealogical study that traces a “broadly Cartesian” pattern of argumentation: from Augustine’s scriptural semiotic to the “narrowly Cartesian” practice of foundationalism to Charles Peirce’s pragmatic and reparative semiotic. The essay argues (1) that Augustine transformed Stoic logic into a scriptural semiotic; (2) that this semiotic breeds both Cartesian foundationalism and the pragmatic semiotic that repairs it; (3) that Peirce’s semiotic displays the latter. In sum, Augustine’s inquiry risks foundationalism but also breeds a self-corrective “reparative reasoning.” This reasoning (...) is at once scriptural and philosophic. (shrink)

Is the societal-level of analysis sufficient today to understand the values of those in the global workforce? Or are individual-level analyses more appropriate for assessing the influence of values on ethical behaviors across country workforces? Using multi-level analyses for a 48-society sample, we test the utility of both the societal-level and individual-level dimensions of collectivism and individualism values for predicting ethical behaviors of business professionals. Our values-based behavioral analysis indicates that values at the individual-level make a more significant contribution to (...) explaining variance in ethical behaviors than do values at the societal-level. Implicitly, our findings question the soundness of using societal-level values measures. Implications for international business research are discussed. (shrink)

What does ‘Smith knows that it might be raining’ mean? Expressivism here faces a challenge, as its basic forms entail a pernicious type of transparency, according to which ‘Smith knows that it might be raining’ is equivalent to ‘it is consistent with everything that Smith knows that it is raining’ or ‘Smith doesn’t know that it isn’t raining’. Pernicious transparency has direct counterexamples and undermines vanilla principles of epistemic logic, such as that knowledge entails true belief and that something can (...) be true without one knowing it might be. I re-frame the challenge in precise terms and propose a novel expressivist formal semantics that meets it by exploiting (i) the topic-sensitivity and fragmentation of knowledge and belief states and (ii) the apparent context-sensitivity of epistemic modality. The resulting form of assertibility semantics advances the state of the art for state-based bilateral semantics by combining attitude reports with context-sensitive modal claims, while evading various objectionable features. In appendices, I compare the proposed system to Beddor and Goldstein’s ‘safety semantics’ and discuss its analysis of a modal Gettier case due to Moss. (shrink)

How is Jewish-Christian theological dialogue possible today? Assuming that the possibility of dialogue is not something to be envisioned by any individual thinker a priori, I offer here a study of two examples of successful Jewish-Christian theological dialogue: George Lindbeck's dialogue with Jewish sources and Michael Wyschogrod's dialogue with Christian sources. To garner some general lessons from these examples, I try to reconstruct the general conditions of dialogue which they appear to share. Discovering that the two dialogues may share identifiable (...) conditions of problem-solving, I label these "pragmatic" conditions, after Charles Peirce's definition of pragmatism as the claim that the purpose of rational inquiry is to solve the problems that stimulate it. I conclude that these are the conditions that may underlie theological dialogue among the specific group of Jewish and Christian theologians to which I believe Lindbeck and Wyschogrod belong. These conditions may underlie dialogues typical of other groups, too, but there is no way to know this a priori. (shrink)

This paper is a study of higher-order contingentism – the view, roughly, that it is contingent what properties and propositions there are. We explore the motivations for this view and various ways in which it might be developed, synthesizing and expanding on work by Kit Fine, Robert Stalnaker, and Timothy Williamson. Special attention is paid to the question of whether the view makes sense by its own lights, or whether articulating the view requires drawing distinctions among possibilities that, according to (...) the view itself, do not exist to be drawn. The paper begins with a non-technical exposition of the main ideas and technical results, which can be read on its own. This exposition is followed by a formal investigation of higher-order contingentism, in which the tools of variable-domain intensional model theory are used to articulate various versions of the view, understood as theories formulated in a higher-order modal language. Our overall assessment is mixed: higher-order contingentism can be fleshed out into an elegant systematic theory, but perhaps only at the cost of abandoning some of its original motivations. (shrink)

You ask if metaphysics is possible after modernity, or after Barth and Wittgenstein and Derrida and the critique of foundationalism? May I invite you, by way of response, to listen in on a conversation? It is a dialogue between what I will call a postcritical philosopher ("P") and a postcritical scriptural theologian —— I'll label the latter a "textualist" ("T"). What I mean by "postcritical" would be displayed as the pattern of inquiry traced by this dialogue. I take the term (...) "postcritical" from George Lindbeck, whose theological work is described by his commentators as more properly "textualist" rather than "philosophic." I believe my usage is, however, true to Lindbeck's discourse. This means that one of the arguments of this essay is that there is a mode of philosophic inquiry proper to the postcritical orientation in theology that we may associate with such Christian theologians as Hans Frei, etc., as well as Lindbeck. A second argument, offered indirectly, is that there is a family of Jewish thinkers whose work may also be labeled "postcritical" on the model of these Christian thinkers, and that this Jewish postcritical theology would also be displayed in dialogues between philosophic and textualist tendencies. A third argument is that, if we listen in on the philosophic side of any of these dialogues, we will hear a postcritical philosophy. By philosophy, I mean primarily logic, defined as an inquiry that examines problematic rules of reasoning and recommends testable ways of correcting them. Secondarily, philosophy includes metaphysics, defined as an inquiry that, for the sake of assuring people about the reliability of a given logic, constructs pictures of the world whose existence would warrant this logic. We need not assume either that logic and metaphysics can be conducted only in the manner of modern and scholastic foundationalism, or that non-foundationalist theology must be "textualist" in a manner that excludes any philosophic generalization. I will argue that there are, indeed, non-foundationalist ways of conceiving of both logical and metaphysical inquiry and that these ways contribute to the dialogic activity of postcritical inquiry. (shrink)

This is a response to a Symposium on Phenomenology and Scripture. In examining a move from phenomenology to scripture, this symposium does not address all possible readers; it addresses a specific readership, for a specific reason, and within the framework of specific assumptions. By way of response, I want first to identify a few features of what I take to be the symposium’s specific address or context. Then, I will comment on what messages I believe the authors have delivered to (...) this context. The symposium specifically addresses those who participate willy nilly in the transcendental project of modern philosophy and of modern northern Europe. In that project, knowing, as noesis, means intentionality: its subject or agent is ultimately reducible to the unity of apperception; and its object— noema—is the object of the ego’s intentional knowing—the thematized object. It appears, furthermore, that the symposium identifies phenomenology not only with the species of Husserlian philosophy, but also with the broader genus of all efforts, from Descartes to Kant to Hegel to Husserl to Heidegger, to identify philosophy with an effort to frame the a priori conditions for, or the possibility of, knowing what we would know: from self to world to being itself—or to God. (shrink)

The relationship of part to whole is one of the most fundamental there is; this is the first and only full-length study of this concept. This book shows that mereology, the formal theory of part and whole, is essential to ontology. Peter Simons surveys and criticizes previous theories, especially the standard extensional view, and proposes a more adequate account which encompasses both temporal and modal considerations in detail. 'Parts could easily be the standard book on mereology for the next (...) twenty or thirty years.' Timothy Williamson, Grazer Philosophische Studien. (shrink)

We explore some possibilities for developing epistemic logic using truthmaker semantics. We identify three possible targets of analysis for the epistemic logician. We then list some candidate epistemic principles and review the arguments that render some controversial. We then present the classic Hintikkan approach to epistemic logic and note—as per the ‘problem of logical omniscience’—that it validates all of the aforementioned principles, controversial or otherwise. We then lay out a truthmaker framework in the style of Kit Fine and present six (...) different ways of extending this semantics with a conditional knowledge operator, drawing on notions of implication and content that are prominent in Fine’s work. We demonstrate that different logics are thereby generated, bearing on the aforementioned epistemic principles. Finally, we offer preliminary observations about the prospects for each logic. (shrink)

When do two sentences say the same thing, that is, express the same content? We defend two-component (2C) semantics: the view that propositional contents comprise (at least) two irreducibly distinct constituents: (1) truth-conditions and (2) subject-matter. We contrast 2C with one-component (1C) semantics, focusing on the view that subject-matter is reducible to truth-conditions. We identify exponents of this view and argue in favor of 2C. An appendix proposes a general formal template for propositional 2C semantics.

Peter Ludlow presents the first book on the philosophy of generative linguistics, including both Chomsky's government and binding theory and his minimalist ...